devices) as binding precedent that specifically authorized the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Stephens is representative of the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" that most of the circuit courts have used to resolve the exclusionary rule question. This Article, therefore, uses Stephens as a vehicle for analyzing that approach. This Article argues that decisions like Stephens have stretched the holding of Davis and interpreted Knotts in a way that contradicts Supreme Court precedent. And, the circuit courts have done so for no good reason because they could have reached the same result-refusing to exclude the GPS vehicle tracker evidence-by working through the general good-faith analysis. Instead, most of the circuit courts have chosen to resolve the exclusionary rule issue by defining the terms "specifically authorized" and "binding precedent" to mean "suggested" and "persuasive precedent." In the process, the courts have converted the intentionally narrow holding of Davis into a broad decision with unknown boundaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. United States 1 seems straightforward: "We hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule."
2 Those words, however, have proven to be anything but straightforward. Identifying the scope of Davis's holding has generated much controversy in the lower courts 3 and the legal academy.
"beeper." 12 Both Knotts and Karo applied the tried-and-true reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States 13 to determine whether a Fourth Amendment "search" occurred. 14 The Jones Court's reliance on trespass law instead of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was unanticipated, 15 and it caused considerable angst in the law enforcement community. 16 That angst was understandable; at the moment Jones was decided, there were thousands of GPS vehicle trackers being monitored by police agencies nationwide. 17 Very few of those were installed and monitored with judicial approval. 18 Given the generally accepted belief that Knotts and Karo authorized GPS tracking on public roadways, the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers was standard police practice. 19 Indeed, it was United States Department of Justice policy not to seek a warrant to monitor a GPS device on public roadways. 20 So, the question raised in courtrooms nationwide in the 12 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 ("A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver."); see also Ian Herbert, Note, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 467-76 (2011) (explaining how the "beeper" used in Knotts worked and comparing it to newer location-tracking technology, including GPS). 13 
U.S. 347 (1967).
14 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (applying the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and concluding that " [a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another"); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-15 (applying the Katz test and distinguishing Knotts because the beeper in Karo was monitored while inside of a home, a place (unlike the public roadways) where the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy). 15 See Jace C. Gatewood, It's Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States v. Jones-A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 690 (2013) (explaining that "many were left utterly shocked by the Court's almost total rejection" of Katz, Knotts, and Karo "in favor of a doctrine that most believed was dead-the 'trespass doctrine'"). 16 See Carrie Johnson, FBI Still Struggling with Supreme Court's GPS Ruling, NPR (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/21/149011887/fbi-still-struggling-with-supreme-courtsgps-ruling (reporting that "Jones set off alarm bells inside the FBI, where officials are trying to figure out whether they need to change the way they do business"). 17 See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5360051, at *59 (estimating that federal law enforcement agencies annually installed GPS devices "in the low thousands").
18
See Johnson, supra note 16. 19 See generally United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2014) (reporting that the officer who installed the GPS vehicle tracker at issue "had attached a GPS to other vehicles in public areas without a warrant, and it was his understanding that a warrant was needed only when . . . the GPS was wired into the vehicle's battery system"), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313).
20
See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (reporting that prior to Jones, the Department of Justice policy was "that a warrant was not required to install a wake of Jones was (and continues to be) as follows: Does the exclusionary rule apply to evidence obtained from GPS vehicle trackers that were installed and monitored without a warrant before Jones?
In seeking to answer that question, the courts have run head-on into Davis's holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply where officers relied in good faith on binding precedent that was later overruled. The question has now been considered by almost all of the federal circuit courts 21 and a handful of state appellate courts. 22 The vast majority of the courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule on the basis that the officers who installed and monitored the GPS vehicle trackers pre-Jones acted in good faith. With the exception of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 23 the federal appellate courts have reached that conclusion by holding that the Supreme Court's decision regarding "beepers" in Knotts (or a circuit court decision authorizing the use of "beepers") qualified under Davis as binding precedent specifically authorizing the installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. 24 Those courts have endorsed a broad battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public street and to surveil it on public roads"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015) . The Ninth Circuit relied on its prior decision in McIver to conclude that the exclusionary rule was inappropriate under Davis because the installation and monitoring of the GPS vehicle tracker complied with binding circuit court precedent that was later overruled. See Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d at 1090 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule under Davis because prior "circuit precedent held that placing an electronic tracking device on the undercarriage of a car was neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment"). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit relied on one of its prior decisions in Fisher to conclude that precedent provided binding authority permitting the police to use the GPS tracker. Stephens majority and the dissent fully addressed the arguments on both sides; therefore, Stephens is an excellent vehicle for discussing and analyzing the applicability of Davis to the pre-Jones installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. The Stephens majority-like many of its sister circuitsscoffed at the defendant's narrow interpretation of Davis and held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained from a GPS vehicle tracker that was installed and monitored without a warrant. 27 Although the Stephens majority admitted there was no binding Fourth Circuit precedent specifically authorizing the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers, the Court opined that "a reasonably well-trained officer in this Circuit could have relied on [the Supreme Court's decision in] Knotts as permitting" such conduct.
28 Similar reasoning can be found in opinions from the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
29
Judge Stephanie Thacker sharply disagreed with the Stephens majority. She argued in her dissent that the holding of Davis was a "specific and narrow" one that required "binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing" the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. 30 This Article examines the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" and explains why such an approach is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. This Article also argues that the circuit courts should have resolved cases like Stephens by applying the general "good-faith" analysis. Part II discusses the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with a particular focus on the good-faith exception. Part III provides a brief summary of the majority and dissenting opinions from the Fourth Circuit's decision in Stephens. Part IV analyzes the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" that has been adopted by Stephens and most other circuit courts. It argues that a better approach would have been for the courts to resolve the exclusionary rule issue by simply applying the general good-faith analysis. Part V considers how the broad reading of Davis that underlies the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" will play out in future cases, such as those involving the application of the exclusionary rule to cell phone searches conducted before the Supreme Court's recent watershed decision in Riley v. California. 34 A brief conclusion follows in Part VI.
32
See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 187-97 (Greenaway, J., dissenting). Judge Greenaway was the author of the Third Circuit's panel decision, which applied the exclusionary rule and found that Knotts did not qualify as binding appellate precedent under Davis. Id. The en banc Third Circuit vacated the panel decision and held eight to five that the evidence was saved from suppression by the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 2473, 2480 (2014) . The Court in Riley held that police officers must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone, even if the cell phone was found on the defendant's person at the time of his lawful arrest. Id. at 2485. In reaching that conclusion, the Court carved out an exception to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine-a doctrine that allows police officers who make a lawful arrest to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's person, including containers found on the arrestee's person. Id. at 2483-84.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has long been controversial. 35 And, the rule's development has been anything but smooth. Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart once referred to the exclusionary rule as "a bit jerry-built-like a roller coaster track constructed while the roller coaster sped along." 36 In the years since its creation in 1914, the exclusionary rule has certainly taken many twists and turns. Perhaps the most significant twists and turns have occurred in the last decade-a time period during which the Supreme Court issued a number of important decisions regarding the exclusionary rule's scope. The following sections explain the current status of the exclusionary rule and describe the road the Court took to get there.
A. The Road to Davis v. United States
The exclusionary rule, generally speaking, prevents the prosecution from introducing evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 37 Although the general rule is easy enough to recite, its precise scope has been the source of ongoing debate and continual change. 38 46 It is a judicially created remedy that was initially viewed as serving two purposes: (1) deterring unconstitutional police conduct 47 and (2) maintaining judicial integrity. 48 For a period of time after its creation, the exclusionary rule was viewed as "a selfexecuting" constitutional mandate that required no further analysis. 49 If there was a Fourth Amendment violation, then the evidence was automatically excluded.
50 That began to change over time, however, as the Court recognized numerous exceptions.
Burden of Proof, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 164 (2015) (stating that through cases like Herring and Davis, the Supreme Court has "clearly changed the suppression landscape").
43
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (insisting that the exclusionary rule "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse," while recognizing that over the years some opinions "did not always speak so guardedly").
44
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) ("We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States, acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (stating that the "purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))).
48
Id. at 659 (explaining that "there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity" (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217)). See Ferguson, supra note 38, at 625 (explaining that the exclusionary rule was "once an automatic remedy for constitutional violations").
Those exceptions include the independent source doctrine, 51 the inevitable discovery doctrine, 52 the attenuation doctrine, 53 and-of particular importance to the current discussion-the good-faith exception. 54 The goodfaith exception was announced in United States v. Leon. 55 In Leon, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule where an officer reasonably relied on a magistrate's issuance of a warrant that was later found to be invalid. 56 The rationale of Leon was applied in Illinois v. Krull to prevent the exclusion of evidence where an officer reasonably relied on a legislative enactment later determined to be unconstitutional. 57 It was also applied in Arizona v. Evans to prevent the exclusion of evidence where an officer reasonably relied on courtmanaged databases later found to be inaccurate. 58 Leon, Krull, and Evans all shared one key attribute-the good-faith reliance of a police officer on an erroneous act by either the judicial or legislative branches of government.
59 At the time they were announced, the exceptions were exactly that-exceptions. The general rule for evidence obtained in connection with a violation of the Fourth Amendment remained exclusion.
That the Fourth Amendment's knock and announce requirement. 61 Hudson ushered in a new era of Fourth Amendment law-an era where the exclusionary rule is the judiciary's "last resort, not our first impulse."
62 While the Court recognized that some of its prior cases did not "speak so guardedly" about the exclusionary rule, Hudson explained that evidence should only be excluded when the deterrent value of exclusion exceeds the "substantial social costs" of letting guilty people go free. 63 Whereas the exclusionary rule was initially viewed as serving the dual purposes of deterrence and the maintenance of judicial integrity, Hudson not so covertly signaled that deterrence was the principal rationale going forward. 64 The signal from Hudson became a command three years later in Herring v. United States. 65 The specific holding in Herring was that the goodfaith exception applied to an officer's objectively reasonable reliance on a law enforcement database that was later found to be inaccurate. 66 The Court's holding was significant because it extended the good-faith exception to an error committed by a law enforcement entity, as opposed to another branch of government.
67 But, Herring is less important for what it specifically held than for the broad doctrine-changing language that is littered throughout the opinion. Id. at 591; see Ferguson, supra note 38, at 631 (writing that prior to Hudson "Supreme Court opinions assumed with little difficulty an intrinsic link between the exclusionary rule and unconstitutional action, without any separation of rights and remedies"); see also Blair, supra note 60, at 760 ("The decision in Hudson has now made it possible to so finely delineate the interests protected by various parts of the Fourth Amendment that the exclusionary rule sanction will not be an appropriate remedy for some constitutional violations."). 
68
See Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 390 (stating that the "Herring majority . . . was not content merely to resolve this narrow issue," opting instead to speak "quite broadly" about the exclusionary rule); see also LaFave, supra note 45, at 758 (criticizing Herring and speculating on how the Court's decision will alter the application of the exclusionary rule going forward); see also Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1203-04 (2012) (stating that Herring contained "big blast" language that signaled the Court's intent to "restrict the exclusionary rule to instances of culpable police behavior").
The Herring Court made clear that the exclusionary rule is a remedy that must be analyzed separately from the determination of whether there was a constitutional violation. 69 In the words of the Court, "that a search or arrest was unreasonable-does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies." 70 Rather, the exclusionary rule only applies if the officer's conduct was "deliberate, reckless, . . . grossly negligent" or the result of "recurring or systemic negligence." 71 The language and tone of Herring has led some scholars to declare that the exclusionary rule is now best understood as less of a "rule" and more of an exception that only applies when the deterrent value of suppression outweighs the societal cost of excluding highly probative evidence of guilt. 72 The Herring Court focused entirely on "deterrence and culpability" with not a mention of Mapp v. Ohio's judicial integrity rationale. 73 In a passage that would prove important two years later in Davis, the Court reiterated that the good-faith exception saves evidence from suppression if, under the circumstances, "a reasonably well trained officer" would have believed the search was lawful.
69
See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (pointing out that "suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation"); see also Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by making a reasonable mistake of law, and pointing out that the better approach would be to handle the officer's reasonable mistake of law at the "remedial" step because "[o]ur jurisprudence draws a sharp 'analytica[l] distinct[ion]' between the existence of a Fourth Amendment violation and the remedy for that violation" (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011))); see also Ferguson, supra note 38, at 625 (explaining that Herring represents "new territory for lawyers and courts accustomed to an automatic linkage between constitutional wrongs and constitutional remedies").
70
Herring, 555 U.S. at 140.
71
Id.
72
See Josephson, supra note 59, at 176-77 (characterizing Herring as a "landmark criminal procedure opinion" that "could transform the exclusionary rule by making the exclusion of evidence the exception rather than the rule"); see also Maclin & Rader, supra note 68, at 1208 (explaining that "[i]f under Herring, only culpable or deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment merit suppression, then a great number-perhaps the overwhelming majority-of unreasonable searches and seizures will be immunized from the exclusionary rule").
73
See Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 ("The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free-something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.'" (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984))); see also id. at 147 (explaining that "the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system").
74
See id. at 145 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, for the proposition that "our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances").
B. Davis v. United States
In 2011, the Court released its much-anticipated opinion in Davis v. United States. 75 The precise question before the Court was whether the exclusionary rule should apply to searches conducted in reliance on binding precedent that was later overruled. 76 To understand the Court's conclusion and reasoning, a brief overview of the factual and procedural history of the case is in order.
During the course of a routine traffic stop in 2007, local police officers in Alabama arrested Willie Davis (a passenger in the car) for lying about his identity. 77 The officers handcuffed Davis and secured him in the backseat of a police cruiser. 78 The officers then searched the passenger compartment of the car where they found a handgun in Davis's jacket. 79 Davis-a convicted felon-was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 80 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the gun on the ground that it was found during a warrantless search that was unsupported by probable cause. 
Davis.
85 As Davis's appeal was grinding its way through the system, however, the Supreme Court did an about-face with its 2009 decision in Arizona v. Gant. 86 The Gant Court held that officers may only search a car incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant if: (1) the arrestee is unsecured and within the grabbing area of the car during the search; or (2) there is reason to believe that evidence related to the crime of arrest will be found in the car. 87 In light of Gant, the Eleventh Circuit found in Davis that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched the car. 88 But the Eleventh Circuit refused to exclude the gun because the officers relied in good faith on prior binding precedent that specifically authorized the search. 89 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by Justice Alito. 90 Picking up where Herring left off, the Davis Court reinforced the notion that the exclusionary rule is a punitive device that should only be used in response to police conduct that was "deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system. ' Id. at 1264 ("We now enter the fray and hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on our well-settled precedent, even if that precedent is subsequently overruled."). 94 or a law enforcement database (Herring), 95 the Court concluded that "evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." 96 In her solo concurrence, Justice Sotomayor opined that the Court's decision should not be read as addressing the "markedly different question" of whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law is in flux and there is no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing the officer's conduct. 97 That "markedly different question" is one of many left unanswered by the Court's holding in Davis. 98 Clearly, the exclusionary rule does not apply when an officer conducts a search that was specifically authorized by a prior published opinion from the governing federal circuit court. But how close do the facts of the current case and the prior case need to be in order for the officer's conduct to be specifically authorized by the prior case? 99 What if a court opinion suggests that the officer's search would be permitted, "or leaves a bunch of clues, without definitively resolving the question?" 100 Does Davis apply if the governing circuit court has not addressed a particular issue, but the overwhelming weight of authority from the other circuits supports the officer's conduct?
101 These are the difficult questions that have confronted the circuit courts, including the Fourth Circuit in Stephens. And, the approach the Fourth would have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.").
94
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) ("There is no indication that the arresting officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record. Application of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.").
95
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147-48 ("[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence [achieved by application of the exclusionary rule] does not 'pay its way.'"). 
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The case against Henry Stephens began in 2011 when a federal drug taskforce suspected he was violating drug and firearms laws. 103 As part of the investigation, on May 13, 2011, a Baltimore police officer installed a GPS vehicle tracker underneath Stephens's car while it was in a public parking lot. 104 The officer, who had been deputized as a federal taskforce officer, did not have a search warrant.
105 Using the information provided by the GPS device, officers later located Stephens and his car outside of a nightclub where he worked as a security guard. 106 A search of Stephens's car led to the discovery of a handgun.
107 Because Stephens had a prior felony conviction, he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
108
As Stephens awaited trial, the Supreme Court held in Jones that the installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker constituted a Fourth Amendment "search," even if the monitoring occurred on public roads.
109
Stephens promptly filed a motion to suppress based on Jones. 110 The district court found that Jones rendered the installation and monitoring of the GPS 
106
Stephens, 764 F.3d at 330.
107
108
109
110
Id. Stephens moved to suppress the location information obtained from the GPS vehicle tracker. Id. He also sought suppression of the handgun on the theory that the handgun was a fruit of the location information illegally obtained from the GPS vehicle tracker. Id.
vehicle tracker on Stephens's car unconstitutional.
111 Nonetheless, the district court applied the good-faith exception and refused to suppress the evidence.
112
Stephens appealed, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
113

B. The Majority Opinion
The Fourth Circuit majority initially framed the question presented as "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known" that it was unconstitutional to install and monitor a GPS tracking device without a warrant. 114 The Court answered that question in the negative and affirmed the district court's refusal to suppress the evidence. 115 The majority acknowledged that when the officer installed the GPS vehicle tracker on Stephens's car, there was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent specifically holding that GPS vehicle trackers could be installed and monitored without a warrant.
116
This absence of binding precedent specifically authorizing GPS vehicle trackers, Stephens argued, placed the case beyond the scope of Davis's holding.
117 Under Stephens's interpretation of Davis, the good-faith exception did not apply where an officer relied on "nonbinding precedent, no matter how extensive and well-developed that precedent may be."
118
Although skeptical of Stephens's narrow interpretation of Davis, the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve whether the good-faith exception applies to an officer's reliance on nonbinding precedent because the court concluded that binding precedent, namely the Supreme Court's decision in 111 Id.
112
113
Judge Shedd authored the majority opinion, which Judge Hamilton joined. Id. at 329. Judge Thacker dissented. Id.
114
115
Interestingly, the first paragraph of the Fourth Circuit's opinion contains a significant typographical error. The court began by posing the question: "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances." Id. The court went on to say that "the answer to this question is 'yes.' Therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and we affirm . . . ." Id. Indeed, if the court's answer to the question it posed was actually "yes," then the result would have been the application of the exclusionary rule and reversal. It is clear, however, from reading the opinion that the answer to the question posed was "no," and the appearance of "yes" in the opinion was a typographical error.
116
Id. at 332.
117
Id. at 336-37. Knotts, authorized the officer's conduct. 119 The Stephens majority recognized that Knotts dealt with beepers and not GPS devices and was, therefore, not identical to the current case.
120 But the court concluded that the factual differences between the two cases were insignificant given Knotts's broad proclamation that "a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another."
121 From the majority's perspective, Knotts could reasonably have been read to cover GPS vehicle trackers. 122 Indeed, before Jones, several other courts had specifically held that Knotts applied to GPS vehicle trackers.
123 Included among those courts was the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. 124 That fact was significant to the Fourth Circuit majority because the GPS vehicle tracker was installed on Stephens's car in Maryland by a local police officer who happened to also be deputized as a federal taskforce officer. 125 The language of Knotts itself and the general preJones consensus by courts led the majority to conclude that the good-faith exception prevented suppression of the evidence.
126
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Thacker advanced three primary points in her vigorous dissent. First, she argued that Davis was inapplicable because "no 'binding appellate precedent' existed in this circuit 'specifically authorizing' law enforcement's actions."
127 To Judge Thacker, Davis required published precedent from the governing circuit court addressing the same legal issue in the same factual circumstances. In her opinion, Knotts was not binding appellate precedent because it did not involve the unauthorized physical attachment of a GPS device to a suspect's property. 128 Additionally, Judge Thacker was concerned about the significant technological differences between the beeper in Knotts
119
Stephens, 764 F.3d at 337. Third, Judge Thacker argued that the deterrence rationale would have been served by applying the exclusionary rule. She emphasized that the officer's conduct occurred after the D.C. Circuit had ruled it unconstitutional to install and monitor GPS vehicle trackers without a warrant; thus, she asserted that the law in the other circuits was unclear at the time the GPS device was Id.; see State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 347 n.5 (S.C. 2014) (noting that "beepers serve as aids to law enforcement already conducting physical surveillance, while a GPS enables officers to take a passive role and simply monitor location data from a computer").
133
Stephens, 764 F.3d at 344 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
134
135
Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina (located within the Fourth Circuit) agreed with Judge Thacker's position and refused to apply the good-faith exception to the preJones installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker. See Adams, 763 S.E.2d at 347. According to the Adams court, neither Knotts nor Karo "expressly or impliedly authorized" the installation of a GPS device. Id. And, the court further concluded that "no pre-Jones precedent in this federal circuit extended Knotts or Karo to the installation and monitoring of a GPS device." Id.
installed. 136 In such a circumstance, Judge Thacker believed officers should be encouraged (via the exclusionary rule) to "err on the side of the Constitution and obtain a warrant."
137 At least one Supreme Court Justice would share Judge Thacker's position-Justice Sotomayor made clear in her Davis concurrence that the good-faith exception should not apply when the law in a particular area is in flux. 138 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE "KNOTTS IS BINDING PRECEDENT UNDER DAVIS" APPROACH The Fourth Circuit's decision in Stephens is undoubtedly important for what it held-that Knotts constitutes binding appellate precedent under Davis.
But it is perhaps even more important for what it almost (and should have) held. Reading the Stephens majority opinion is a bit like watching a movie where you think you know what is going to happen next, but then all of a sudden there is an unforeseen plot twist. And not just an unforeseen twist, but a twist that is inconsistent with events that previously occurred.
At the beginning of its legal analysis, the majority stated that neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit had "expressly approved or disapproved of warrantless GPS usage in 2011." 139 Stephens's argument, of course, was that the absence of such express approval placed the case outside Stephens, 764 F.3d at 346 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
138
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("This case does not present the markedly different question whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled."). Other circuit court judges have expressed the same sentiment as Judge Thacker. See, e.g., United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 192 (3d Cir. 2014) (Greenaway, J., dissenting) ("Where an officer decides to take the Fourth Amendment inquiry into his own hands, rather than to seek a warrant from a neutral magistrate-particularly where the law is as far from settled as it was here-he acts in a constitutionally reckless fashion."), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015).
139
Stephens, 764 F.3d at 332 (majority opinion). the scope of Davis's holding. 140 The majority appeared poised to hold that the good-faith exception applied even in the absence of binding precedent. 141 Indeed, the court expressed its skepticism of the defendant's "narrow view of the good-faith inquiry," 142 and it noted that accepting the narrow view would mean an officer could not rely on "universal, but non-binding, precedent that was directly on point."
143 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the good-faith exception "is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed by the Supreme Court." 144 The scene had been set for the court to take the next step and hold that even though there was no binding appellate precedent in the Fourth Circuit, a reasonable officer would not have known it was illegal to install and monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways. Then, out of nowhere, the Stephens court punted on that "interesting issue" and held instead that the case fit neatly within the scope of Davis because Knotts was binding appellate precedent that specifically authorized the officer's conduct. 145 The Fourth Circuit has company at the 
A. Knotts Does Not Constitute Binding Appellate Precedent
In the pre-Jones era, Knotts could have reasonably been read to suggest that a warrant was not needed to install and subsequently monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways. 149 A suggestion, however, is not what Davis requires. Rather, Davis is a narrow opinion that was intended to address the very distinct situation of an officer engaging in conduct that was "specifically authorize [d] " by "binding precedent that [was] later overruled."
150
Given that the words "specifically authorized" and "binding" appear throughout the Davis opinion, 151 it is easy to conclude that the Court was serious about its opinion only applying where there was prior "binding precedent" that "specifically authorized" the challenged police conduct.
To put it in terms familiar to any law student, Davis only applies when the prior precedent was a published opinion from the governing circuit court (or and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. Id. According to the court, "Knotts and Karo did not constitute binding precedent" because neither case "expressly or impliedly authorized, a physical trespass as occurred in this case." Id. the Supreme Court) that is "on all fours" with the current case. Returning to the example case of Stephens, there was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent specifically authorizing the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones. Rather than acknowledging the absence of binding precedent and deciding the case without reliance on Davis, the Fourth Circuit and many of its sister circuits have mistakenly chosen to pretend that Knotts was binding precedent that specifically authorized the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
152
A close reading of Knotts, however, shows that the Court's decision only addressed the act of monitoring a vehicle's location using a tracking device. It said nothing about the installation of a tracking device on an individual's vehicle. 153 In the second beeper case, Karo, the Court briefly addressed whether installing the beeper in a container implicated the Fourth Amendment. 154 The Karo Court concluded that the installation of the beeper (with permission from the owner of the container where the beeper was placed) was insufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment.
155 Thus, to arrive at the conclusion that the installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker was not a search prior to Jones, one would have to read Knotts and Karo, extrapolate general principles from them, combine those general principles together, and then apply those general principles to GPS vehicle trackers through analogical reasoning. 156 That is a far cry from Davis, where there was a binding appellate court decision holding "X is constitutional" and an officer performed "X." See Mason, supra note 4, at 78 (explaining that "Davis is about express authorization (rather than the possibility of creative analogizing)"); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 188 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for holding that "two disparate Supreme Court precedents [Knotts and Karo]" can be read together to constitute binding appellate precedent for purposes of Davis).
Additionally, beepers and GPS devices (while sharing some similarities) are not synonymous. 157 A beeper "is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver."
158 Beepers require active involvement by a police officer on the street because they only work if an officer with a radio receiver is physically close enough to the beeper to pick up the signal it emits.
159 Beepers also lack the ability to provide location information with pinpoint precision. 160 GPS devices, on the other hand, are much more precise, require fewer resources, and store significantly more data. 161 Indeed, some modern GPS devices can determine location "with accuracy to within ten inches."
162 And, GPS devices can store "8,000 to 17,000 data points" per day 163 all with very little active involvement required on the part of law enforcement officers. 164 To be blunt, treating a case about beepers as though it was binding precedent in a case about GPS devices is akin to treating a case about horses as 157 See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 342 n.4 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (noting that a beeper and a GPS device "are of an entirely different character. A beeper . . . requires law enforcement to at least be in proximity to the device to receive the transmitted signal, whereas a GPS device downloads location data at specific time intervals with no proximity needed."); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 193 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) ("GPS technology is vastly different from the more primitive tracking devices of yesteryear-'beepers.'"); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The electronic tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common with the primitive devices in Knotts."). Id. at 558 (explaining that the "beeper's reliability and range vary, with a typical groundto-ground signal in an uninhabited area of two to four miles," and in more urban areas with an increased likelihood of interference, "the receiver's efficacy may be limited to an area within a two-block radius of the beeper").
160
Id. ("Beeper devices lack the capacity to triangulate an individual's location with pinpoint accuracy, instead only offering more generalized locational data.").
161
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the capabilities of GPS technology); see also Courtney Elgart, Note, The Road from Jones: The Requirement of Reasonableness for a GPS Search of a Vehicle, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 631, 643 (2015) ("GPS uses satellites to determine the location of a receiver, including latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, and direction. A GPS device can calculate its location to within a few centimeters and usually recalculates its location over five to ten second intervals.").
162
See Miller, supra note 158, at 561. 163 Elgart, supra note 161, at 631 ("A Global Positioning System ('GPS') device records its location every five to ten seconds. Over the course of one day, a GPS device could produce approximately 8,000 to 17,000 data points. Those data points include the device's latitude, longitude, altitude, and a time stamp.").
164
See Miller, supra note 158, at 561-62 (explaining that GPS devices provide "the secondary advantage of allowing law enforcement to not allocate personnel to constant roundthe-clock monitoring while allowing them to gain the same information on the movements of the individual/object tracked").
binding precedent in a case about automobiles. There are similarities between the two technologies and they accomplish the same general goal, but they are not the same. Such a situation stands in stark contrast to what happened in Davis. The officer in Davis searched a car incident to the lawful arrest of a recent occupant, and he followed "to the letter" an Eleventh Circuit decision involving a virtually identical fact pattern. 165 The fact patterns were the same, and the legal questions were identical. 166 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court declared in Jones that neither Knotts nor Karo authorized the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. 167 According to the Court, the Jones decision is "perfectly consistent" with Knotts and Karo because those cases did not involve the trespassory installation of a tracking device without the consent of the owner. 168 Thus, the Court's decision in Jones left both Knotts and Karo intact. Put another way, the Supreme Court has made clear that neither Knotts nor Karo authorized officers to install and monitor GPS vehicle trackers without a warrant. It is, therefore, virtually beyond the realm of possibility to believe that the Supreme Court would view Knotts as "binding appellate
169 the installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
Clearly, the circuit courts-like the Stephens court-that have adopted the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" have done so because they cringed at the thought of "set[ting] the criminal loose in the community without punishment" 170 because a well-meaning officer failed to predict the Supreme Court's decision in Jones. Their reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule in such a situation is understandable.
171 But, their approach-squeezing Knotts to fit within Davis-is analytically indefensible and difficult to comprehend. It is made all the more difficult to comprehend by the fact that the Id. (explaining that the search of Davis's car incident to his arrest followed then-existing Eleventh Circuit precedent "to the letter"). court in Stephens and its sister circuits could have taken another, much less rocky, path to the same result.
B. A Better Path Leading to the Same Result
The decisions of those courts that have adopted the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" would have been more analytically sound (but no less controversial) had they resolved the exclusionary rule issue without relying on Davis. Generally speaking, to determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, courts must determine "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances."
172 If the answer is "no," then the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. The good-faith inquiry is reflective of the Supreme Court's current view of the exclusionary rule as the nuclear option that only applies when there is "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence" by the police.
173
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis is only one example of a circumstance where an officer would not have known his conduct was illegal.
174 But other circumstances exist-circumstances not quite as clear as those presented in Davis-where the good-faith exception also should apply. As the Third Circuit has explained, "[e]ven where Davis does not control, it is our duty to consider the totality of the circumstances to answer the 'objectively ascertainable question' of whether a reasonable police officer would have known the search was illegal." 175 Rather than devoting so much energy to unconvincingly explaining why Knotts was binding appellate precedent, the circuit courts should have simply answered the general good-faith question of whether on May 31, 2011, a reasonable officer would have known it was unlawful to install and monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways without a warrant. Considering the legal landscape prior to Jones, there is a strong argument that the question should have been answered "no." (2015); see also LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d at 1057 (agreeing with Katzin that even if Knotts was not binding precedent under Davis the exclusionary rule would be inapplicable under the "Supreme Court's general good-faith analysis" because the officer "in relying on the legal landscape that existed at the time the search was conducted" did not act unreasonably or with the required level of culpability).
176
See generally United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) ("One can doubt that much deterrence is to be had from telling the police that they are not entitled to rely on Looking specifically at the facts of Stephens, it should be remembered that when the officer (a local Maryland police officer working on a federal taskforce) installed the GPS vehicle tracker on Stephens's car, there was Maryland state court precedent authorizing his conduct. 177 Moreover, from the officer's past experience with GPS vehicle trackers, he had no reason to believe a warrant was required. 178 In fact, as the district court judge remarked, if the officer had sought a warrant the magistrate judge likely would have said "you don't need a warrant for that." 179 The United States Department of Justice shared the same view.
180 So too did the Fourth Circuit's sister circuits (save one) who had addressed the issue of GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones.
181
And while out-of-circuit decisions are not binding, it is commonplace and certainly not unreasonable for officers-like lawyers and judges-to rely on out-of-circuit precedent when the governing circuit has yet to confront a particular problem.
182 Expecting more of police officers than of Article III judges, state court judges, and federal prosecutors is fundamentally unfair.
183
decisions issued by several circuits, just because the circuit covering the state in which an investigation is ongoing lacks its own precedent."). 
180
See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 181 ("[I]t was DOJ policy at the time that a warrant was not required to install a battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public street and to surveil it on public roads.").
181
See id. at 180 (stating that prior to Jones there "was a nearly uniform consensus across the federal courts of appeals that addressed the issue that the installation and subsequent use of a GPS or GPS-like device was not a search, or, at most, was a search but did not require a warrant. . . . The lone dissenting voice was United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).").
182
See United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) ("One can doubt that much deterrence is to be had from telling the police that they are not entitled to rely on decisions issued by several circuits, just because the circuit covering the state in which an investigation is ongoing lacks its own precedent.").
183
Interestingly, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion recognized the difficulty of saying that an officer who relies in good faith on non-binding precedent (in the absence of binding precedent) is any more culpable than an officer who relies in good faith on binding precedent. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("But an officer who conducts a search that he believes complies with the Constitution but which, it ultimately turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment's bounds is no more culpable than an officer who follows erroneous 'binding precedent.' Nor is an officer more culpable where circuit If the Supreme Court means what it has said, then the exclusionary rule only applies when officers have violated a defendant's rights deliberately, recklessly, or through gross or systemic negligence. 184 None of those labels fit the conduct of officers like the officer in Stephens who reasonably believed that he was acting lawfully. Thus, the circuit courts should have refused to apply the exclusionary rule in cases like Stephens because no "reasonably well trained officer would have known that . . . [it] was illegal" 185 to install and monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways before Jones. After all, how could an officer be viewed as violating a defendant's rights deliberately, recklessly, or through gross negligence when the officer's actions were consistent with (1) the vast majority of persuasive federal precedent, 186 (2) precedent from numerous state courts, 187 and (3) the legal advice espoused by the highlytrained lawyers at the United States Department of Justice? 188 Instead of taking that straightforward approach, there is now circuit precedent nationwide standing for the proposition that "binding appellate precedent" actually means "persuasive precedent" and "specifically authorizing" actually means "suggesting." Aside from contradicting the express language of Davis's holding, this approach obscures the true nature of the modern exclusionary rule inquiry. By going to such lengths to fit GPS vehicle trackers within the holding of Knotts, the circuit courts in decisions like Stephens have made it (incorrectly) appear that Davis is itself a separate exception rather than one example of a circumstance where a reasonably well trained police officer would not have known his or her conduct was illegal. 189 precedent is simply suggestive rather than 'binding,' where it only describes how to treat roughly analogous instances, or where it just does not exist.").
184
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (stating that "when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . , rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its way.' In such a case, the criminal should not go free because the constable has blundered." (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984))). See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 181 (reporting that prior to Jones, the Department of Justice policy was "that a warrant was not required to install a battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public street and to surveil it on public roads").
189
The Third Circuit primarily held that the Supreme Court's decisions in Knotts and Karo "were binding appellate precedent upon which the agents could reasonably have relied under Davis." Id. at 173. The court, however, did conclude "[i]n the alternative we conclude that, under As explained in the next Part of this Article, the scope of Davis and its place in the overall exclusionary rule scheme is an issue that will continue to face the courts.
V. THE NEXT WAVE OF LITIGATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF DAVIS'S HOLDING
Over two years have passed since Jones declared the installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker to be a Fourth Amendment "search." As discussed in the preceding sections, those two years have been filled with litigation over the fate of evidence gathered from GPS vehicle trackers installed and monitored pre-Jones. Given that most circuit courts have now addressed that question, new cases raising that precise issue will be few. But, Stephens and the other cases that have endorsed the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach" will remain important. That is so because the question of Davis's meaning-and the broader question about the applicability of the exclusionary rule in cases where new technology leads to the upheaval of settled Fourth Amendment expectations-is not going away. Indeed, the next wave of litigation raising those issues has already formed.
That wave of litigation involves the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in Riley v. California. 190 At issue in Riley was the applicability of the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine to cell phones found on a person who had been arrested. 191 Under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine that was first announced in Chimel v. California, 192 officers who have made a lawful arrest may, without a warrant, search the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. 193 In a series of cases following Chimel, the Court held that the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine also authorizes the police to search containers 194 See id. at 763 ("There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.").
194
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine authorized a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a cigarette pack that was found on the defendant's person after his arrest).
property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee." 195 Thus, prior to Riley, the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine provided officers with near carte blanche authority to search every item found on an arrestee's person or within the arrestee's grabbing area, so long as the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
196
As the prevalence of cell phones increased, police officers were frequently finding them on arrestees. 197 And, that raised the following question in courts nationwide: Is a warrant required to search the contents of the cell phone, or may the police conduct such a search under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine? 198 The lower courts were divided on the answer, but the majority view was that the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine authorized warrantless searches of cell phones found on an arrestee's person at the time of arrest. 199 Those courts generally viewed cell phones as containers-and there was a bright-line rule that containers found on the person of an arrestee were subject to search under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine. See Lawton, supra note 198, at 104-05 ("Most courts, both federal and state, that have considered searches of cell phones incident to arrest have treated those devices as containers, drawing analogies between cell phones and address books, or pagers, for example."); see also That bright-line rule became much dimmer on June 25, 2014, when the Court issued its decision in Riley. The Riley Court narrowed the scope of the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine by holding that, absent exigent circumstances, officers must have a warrant to "search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested."
201 Due largely to their "immense storage capacity," the Court distinguished cell phones from other containers that cannot store nearly as much private information.
202
The issue now being litigated in the lower courts is whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained via warrantless searches of cell phones conducted incident to lawful arrest before Riley. 203 Building on its success in having the lower courts refuse to exclude evidence obtained from GPS vehicle trackers installed and monitored pre-Jones, the government has been pushing the courts to apply Davis to the pre-Riley cell phone search cases. 204 Thus, to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies to pre-Riley Gershowitz, supra note 196, at 31 ("Thus, if we think of an iPhone as a container-like a cigarette package or a closed box-police can open and search the contents inside with no questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as they are doing so pursuant to a valid arrest.").
201
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477.
202
See id. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person. . . . Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion of privacy."). See, e.g., Clark, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 1145 ("The government contends the exclusionary rule should not apply here because Officer Narramore engaged in a limited search of the smartphone at the scene of arrest and during the interview under a good faith assumption that no warrant was necessary.").
searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest, the courts are plowing the same ground they plowed in the post-Jones GPS vehicle tracker cases.
Three circuits had explicitly held in pre-Riley published opinions that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest were authorized by the Fourth Amendment. 205 In those circuits, Davis clearly applies because the officers were relying on "binding precedent that [was] later overruled." 206 And, one circuit-the First Circuit-had explicitly held pre-Riley that cell phones could not be searched incident to lawful arrest without a warrant. 207 It cannot be disputed, therefore, that Davis does not save the evidence obtained from preRiley cell phone searches in the First Circuit. But, what about the circuits that had not specifically addressed searching cell phones incident to lawful arrest before Riley?
Those circuits will be in the same position the Fourth Circuit and many of its sister circuits were in with regard to evidence obtained from GPS vehicle trackers that were installed and monitored before Jones. Relying on the broad reading of Davis embodied by the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach," the government is, unsurprisingly, advancing the argument that the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in United States v. Robinson, 208 regarding the search of a cigarette pack, constituted binding precedent specifically authorizing the search of a cell phone incident to lawful arrest before Riley. 209 modern-day container. Therefore, Robinson authorized the search incident to lawful arrest of cell phones. So far, the government's argument has gained some traction with one circuit court and several district courts finding it persuasive.
211
As the issue continues to work its way through the system, courts without any pre-Riley precedent directly addressing searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest should resist the temptation to employ the reasoning that led to the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach." In other words, the courts should refuse to identify a case (i.e., Robinson) from over forty years ago that shares some basic similarities with the searching of cell phones and pretend that it qualifies under Davis as binding precedent that specifically authorized police officers to search a cell phone-a device that was little more than a pipe dream at the time Robinson was decided. Instead, the courts should simply conduct the general good-faith inquiry by asking and answering the following question: At the time of the search, would a reasonably well trained police officer have known that it was illegal to search a cell phone incident to lawful arrest? The answer to that question may not be easy, but at least it is the right question to ask. Should the courts choose, however, to adopt the same broad reading of Davis that led to the "Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach," the result will be a continued and unwarranted distortion of Davis's narrow holding. 212 devices as containers, drawing analogies between cell phones and address books, or pagers"); see also Gershowitz, supra note 196, at 31 (stating pre-Riley that "if we think of an iPhone as a container-like a cigarette pack or a closed box-police can open and search the contents inside with no questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as they are doing so pursuant to a valid arrest"). See generally People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1070-71 (Ill. 2015) (Burke, J., dissenting) (opining that the broad "legal landscape" interpretation of Davis endorsed by many courts is "directly at odds with Davis" itself which "recognized a narrow exception" that "was limited to jurisdictions which clearly authorized the officer's conduct . . . . There are no references in Davis to 'generally accepted authority,' 'legal landscape,' or persuasive or wellreasoned precedent.").
